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COMMENTS
TAXATION-EXTINGUISHMENT

OF A CONTRACT

OBLIGATION AS A "SALE OR EXCHANGE" OF A
CAPITAL ASSET
I
The capital gains and losses provisions of section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code do not affect the disposition of an asset unless
first, the asset is a capital asset as defined by that section,' and, second,
the disposition is of a type which may be characterized as a "sale or
exchange" of the asset. 2 If either of these requirements is lacking in
a transaction, section 117 does not apply.
For the purposes of this discussion the question of whether any
given asset is a capital asset will generally not be answered; it will
usually be assumed without discussion either that the asset qualifies
as a capital asset, or that whether it is or is not is of no consequence
because no "sale or exchange" has been involved.
The aim of this paper is to discuss the retuirement of "sale or
exchange"; in particular, to indicate some of the inconsistencies (in
approach to the problem of whether a "sale or exchange" has been
effected) apparent in one particular area of litigation. Into this area
fall cases in which a right under some type of contract is released
to the obligor for consideration; specifically, cases involving debts,
mortgages, leases and options, and employment and exclusive agency
contracts.
II
DEBTS

It has been judicially pronounced that the rule, that terms in the
Code are ordinarily to be taken in their usual meaning, 3 applies to
the terms "sale or exchange" under section 117.4 Under this approach
it might be said that when a debtor pays money to retire his note or
bond there is at least an "excliange" of an obligation for cash. In 1929,
the Board of Tax Appeals, calling attention to the fact that the purpose of capital gain and loss treatment, as shown by the legislative
history of a predecessor of section 117, was to encourage taxable
dispositions of property, decided that the redemption of bonds at the
"called" date resulted in a "sale or exchange." 5 This case was overlINT. REv. CODE §§117(a)(1) and 117(j)(1).
2INT. REV. Code §§117(a)(2),(3),(4),(5) and

(b), and 117(j) (2). Itwill be

noted that any loss sustained on the disposition of a 117(j) asset is an ordinary
one whether or not an actual sale or exchange has occurred, either under

117(j) (2) or 23(e) or (f).
3DeGanay v. Lederer, 250 U.S. 376, 381 (1919).
4Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247 (1940).
5 Henry P. Werner, 15 B.T.A. 482 (1929).
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ruled in 1932, when the Board held that no "sale or exchange" was
involved in the payment of Liberty bonds at maturity, saying, "There
was the satisfaction of an obligation of the United States by payment.
Loss incurred or gain realized in such a transaction is not a capital
loss or a capital gain under the definition found in the statute." 6
In 1934, the present section 117(f), which deems proceeds received on the retirement of certain7 bonds and other debentures as
received in "exchange" therefor, was added." The question then arose
as to whether section 117(f) was not merely a legislative construction of the Code as it existed prior to the enactment of section 117(f).
Fairbanks v. United States9 held that section 117(f) was a material
addition to the Code, and that transactions covered by it would not
otherwise qualify as "sales or exchanges."
Where an evidence of indebtedness does not fall under section
117(f) because it lacks coupons or is not in registered form or because it was not issued by a corporation, the rule in Fairbanks v.
United States still applies.' 0 In Hale v. Helvering1 it was held that
a compromise with the maker of promissory notes for an amount
different from their face value does not constitute a "sale or exchange"
because there is no acquisition of any property that survives the transaction by the debtor, any property in the notes as capital assets being
"extinguished" not "sold." Certainly the payment of an obligation according to its fixed terms has the same effect.' 2 The rationale of these
cases seems to be that unless both parties receive an asset of continuing
-value, which an obligation in the hands of the obligor is not, there
is no "sale or exchange." Certainly the debtor has received an economic benefit of continuing value in being discharged of an obligation, but apparently this is not enough. This rationale is subject to
the qualification that if a cooperative creditor accepts the transfer
of property instead of cash in satisfaction of his claim, the debtor is
said to have effected a "sale or exchange" of that property. 3 This
463, 465 (1932).
bonds or other evidences of indebtedness issued by corporations,
which have interest coupons or are in registered form.
: Revenue Act of 1934 (May 10, 1934, ch. 277, 48 STAT. 680, 714, 715).
9306 U.S. 436 (1939).
10
See, e.g., Avery v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1940) and Blum v. Hig6 John H. Watson, Jr., 27 B.T.A.
7Those

gins, 150 F.2d 471 (2nd Cir. 1945) holding that surrender of an endowment

insurance policy for an amount in excess of the premiums paid was not a
"sale or exchange" on the ground that neither life insurance nor endowment contracts are enumerated in section 117(f). Also interesting is Joseph
A. Guthrie, 42 B.T.A. 696 (1940), where the taxpayer purchased a share
in a residuary legacy. The Board held that the gain realized by the taxpayer
on a sale of the legacy by the executor was ordinary income since there
was no "sale or exchange" of his asset, and further that the sale by the
executor could not be imputed to the taxpayer.
-1185 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
12 Watson, supra, n. 6.
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qualification seems to be well founded in reason, since the transaction
is essentially the same in result to the debtor as if he had sold the
property to a third party and used the proceeds to pay his debt. But
the character of the transaction with respect to the obligee remains
unaffected by the fact that the debtor transfers property instead of
money for the satisfaction of his debt; in Elverson Corp. v'. Helvering,14 a defaulting pledgor surrendered stock to the owner of notes
who cancelled the notes and paid the indebtedness of the pledgor by
purchasing unpledged shares at a specific price, all as previously agreed.
The court held that there was no "sale or exchange" of the notes for
the shares as far as the owner of the notes was concerned.
The transfer of a debt to a third person for consideration is not
afflicted with the infirmity of constituting an extinguishment of an
obligation. The transaction, therefore, may represent a "sale or exchange." 15 The intent of the taxpayer, to transfer to the third party
in order to effect a tax saving, does not alter the effect of the transaction.' However, if the transaction is in essence the payment of the
17
debt to the creditor by the debtor, no "sale or exchange" results. If
the debtor makes payment to the third party after the transfer, no
capital gain or loss treatment follows, because the third party stands
on the same ground as the original creditor had there been no transfer.""
III
MORTGAGES
A conveyance by a mortgagor of the mortgaged property to a
third party for consideration results in a "sale or exchange" giving
rise to capital gain or loss, 9 while the abandonment of the premises to
"3 E.g., Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2nd Cir. 1940), where the trustee
of an estate transferred securities to a legatee in satisfaction of a claim
greater than the basis of the securities in the hands of the trustee; the
court held that there had been a "sale or exchange" of the securities. In
Mesta v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 986 (3rd Cir. 1941), the taxpayer transferred
securities to his wife pursuani to a divorce settlement in satisfaction of a
claim held to be in excess of the basis of the securities. The court decided
that the taxpayer had realized a capital gain, but did not discuss the question
of "sale or exchange."
24 122 F.2d 295 (2nd Cir. 1941).
15 Levy v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 544 (2nd Cir. 1942). However the result
is otherwise where the debt has arisen because of personal seivices or some
other activity the proceeds from which are usually taxable as ordinary in-

come. "The courts have said that the sale of a right to receive ordinary income is not the sale of a capital asset. This is so even if the sale is of something which may be termed 'property.' In such a situation the sale price
simply replaces the future income, but the sale price does not convert the
ordinary income into capital gain." But see, Swiren v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d
656,661 (7th Cir. 1950).
N. Hilton, 13 T.C. 623 (1949).

16 Conrad
17 Ibid.

18 Thomas v. Perkins, 108 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1939).
'9 Phillips

v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 721 (3rd Cir. 1940).
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a third party without consideration does not 20 Further, the payment
by the mortgagor of all or a part of the mortgage obligation falls
under the rule of Hale v. Helvering,2 ' and represents no "sale or exchange." 2 2 Prior to 1941, it was disputed as to whether a sheriff's
sale or foreclosure was a "sale or exchange" such as is contemplated
by section 117, because of the involuntary nature of that transaction.23
In that year, however, the Supreme Court of the United States held
that the transaction did represent a "sale or -exchange" by the mortgagor; 21 and this is true25 even though the mortgagor was not personally liable for the debt.
An interesting situation arises when, in anticipation of foreclosure,
the mortgagor conveys the land to the mortgagee. It would seem, at
first glance, that the rule of Hale v. Helvering would apply, since the
result of the transaction is to extinguish an obligation. It is held, however, that no "sale or exchange" has been effected by the mortgagor
only if he was not personally liable on the mortgage debt and received
nothing in consideration for the conveyance.26 Under these facts there
is an abandonment of the property, and any loss that results to the
mortgagor is an ordinary one.27 However, when the mortgagor is
personally liable on the mortgage debt, and the conveyance to the
mortgagee is in consideration of the release in part or in whole of
the mortgagor's liability, any loss that the mortgagor sustains is a capital loss, the transaction being treated as a "sale or exchange."2 8 Further, there is said to be a "sale or exchange" when the mortgagor receives any sort of consideration from the mortgagee for the conveyance.2 9 These decisions are justified by the view that the net result of
the transaction is to place the property in the hands of the mortgagee
and to extinguish the obligation of the mortgagor and that this result
is so little different from a foreclosure that it should be treated in
the same manner as a foreclosure.2 0 It might further be said that,
since the effect of the transaction is the satisfaction by the mortgagor
Park Chamberlain, 41 B.T.A. 10 (1940).
21Supra, n. 11.
22 Lee v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1941).
23 This was held, e. g., in Commissioner v. Freihofer, 102 F.2d 787 (3rd Cir.
1939); see, generally, Paul, Federal Income Tax Problems of Mortgagors
and Mortgagees, 48 Y.L.J. 1315 (1939). Later developments, however, have
2 rendered some of Mr. Paul's conclusions obsolete.
4 Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504 (1941) ; Electro-Chemical Engraving Co.
v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 513 (1941).
25 Commissioner v. Paulson, 123 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1941).
26 Stokes v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 335 (3rd Cir. 1941).
27 Ibid.
28 Commissioner v. Bookstein, 123 F.2d 996 (6th Cir. 1941); Stamler v. Com29 missioner, 145 F.2d 37 (3rd Cir. 1944).
Aberle v. Commissioner, 121 F2d 726 (3rd Cir. 1941) ; Blum v. Commissioner,
133 F.2d 447 (2nd Cir. 1943).
30 Commissioner v. Electro-Chemical Engraving Co., 110 F.2d 614, 616 (2nd
Cir. 1940), aff'd 311 U.S. 513 (1940), supra, n. 24.
20
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of his creditor's money claim by the transfer of property, it is correctly held, as in similar cases, 31 that he has thereby effected a "sale
or exchange" of that property.
As far as the mortgagee is concerned, when he receives part payment of the mortgage obligation and the mortgagor is unable to complete the payment of the total, there is no "sale or exchange" ;32 therefore, any loss he may sustain is an ordinary loss, falling under section 23(k) as a bad debt.3 3 The situation becomes somewhat more
complicated when the mortgagee accepts a conveyance of the encumbered property as consideration for a release of the mortgagor. The
Bureau's original position was that there was a "sale or exchange" in
that event.3 4 However, in Bingham v. Commissioner,3 5 it was held that
no "sale or exchange" arose as far as the mortgagee was concerned; and
6
subsequently, in Spreckels v. Commissioner,"
it was decided that the
added element of worthless collateral security did not alter the rule
in Bingham. In changing its former position, the Bureau placed no
emphasis whatever on the fact that the collateral securities in Spreckels were worthless. 3 7 The rule as enunciated by the Bureau is
"that where a creditor accepts a voluntary conveyance of property, including property pledged as security for the debt, in
partial or full satisfaction of the unpaid portion of the indebtness, the receipt of the property so conveyed, to the extent of
its fair market value at that time, shall be considered as receipt of payment on the obligations satisfied." 38
An interesting situation is created when the mortgagee buys in
at the foreclosure sale. According to the regulations, 39 when an uncollectible deficiency results from a sale of mortgaged property to
the mortgagee or a third party, the mortgagee may deduct it as a bad
debt; in addition, where the mortgagee has bid in, the difference between the amount of the obligations of the debtor which are applied
to the bid price and the fair market value is a capital gain or loss. The
fair market value and the mortgagee's bid price are presumed to be
equal, 40 but this presumption may be rebutted upon independent inquiry.41 The Supreme Court has held, in a case involving an insurance
31 See supra, n. 13.

32Lee v.Commissioner, supra, n. 22. I.T. 3121; C.B. 1937-2, p. 138.
83United States v. Burrows Bros., 133 F.2d 772 (6th Cir. 1943).
34 I.T. 3121, supra, n. 32.
35 105 F.2d 971 (2nd Cir. 1939).
36120 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1941).
7 I.T. 3548; C.B. 1942-1, p. 74.
38 Ibid.
39 Treas. Reg. 118, §39.23 (k)-3.
40 Ibid.
ClIbid; Huey & Philip Hardware Co., 40 B.T.A. 781 (1939). I.T. 3159; C.B.
1938-1, p. 188, gives examples showing the operation of the rule of computation.
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company, that if the bid price is sufficient to include accrued interest,
the mortgagee has realized income to that extent despite the lesser
value of the property. 2 The foregoing rule has been limited to cases
involving insurance companies, any income to a mortgagee in this
43
type of situation being deemed purely "imaginary" by one court.
The effect of the mortgagee's purchase of the land at the foreclosure
sale is to create a transaction, which is at one and the same time a
"sale or exchange" for the purpose of computing the mortgagee's capital gain and the mortgagor's capital loss and also an extinguishment
of an obligation so as to allow the mortgagee a- bad debt deduction.
This treatment of the mortgagee's loss as a bad debt is justifiable
under Hale v. Helvering; but the statement that the mortgagee has
also realized a capital gain or loss on the transaction is difficult to
sustain on authority. The only theory on which the mortgagee could
be said to have realized anything beyond his bad debt loss is to say
that he has exchanged the mortgage obligation for the property. That
this should be viewed as an "exchange" as contemplated by section
117 is contra to the Elverson Case 4 involving a pledge of property
as security. There appears to be no justification for different treatment depending on the type of security device involved.
IV
LEASES AND OPIONS

Clearly, any amount received by a lessor from his lessee in consideration of cancellation of the lease is ordinary income since it is
merely a substitute for future rent and since no "sale or exchange"
is involved. 45 The transfer of the lease by the lessee to a third party
for consideration, however, is held to be a "sale or exchange" of the
lease, not a cancellation. 46 A problem arises when the lessee abandons
his right under the lease to the lessor for consideration. If the rule
in Hale v. Helvering47 is deemed applicable, the attempted sale of the
lease rights to the lessor-obligor results in a termination of the lease
agreement which, in turn, extinguishes the right of possession. The
Tax Court, however, in Isadore Golonsky,48 refused to follow this
line of reasoning. The court said that cases49 holding that payment
by the lessor in such cases was a capital expenditure indicated that
the lessor received something which he did not have before, i.e., the very
42
4

3
44
4
5

Helvering v. Midland Mutual Life Insurance Co., 300 U.S. 216 (1937).
Nichols v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1944).

See supra, n. 14.
Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1940).
46
7 Walter H. Sutliff, 46 B.T.A. 446 (1942).
Supra, n. 11.
48 16 T.C. 1450 (1951).
49
Charles B. Bretzfelder, 21 B.T.A. 789 (1930) ; Harriet B. Borland, 27 B.T.A.
538 (1933).
4
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real and valuable right to the use and possession of the leased premises, and that the transfer of the right was a sufficient transfer to constitute a "sale or exchange." Without discussion, Hale v. Helvering
was said to be unlike the case at hand. Golonsky was affirmed on appeal to the Third Circuit;50 of especial interest is the Third Circuit's
treatment of a facet of the Commissioner's argument not discussed
by the Tax Court in its opinion. The Commissioner-apparently basing
his contention upon Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co.,51
which stated 52 that "These sections [Sections 115(c), 117(e), and
117(f)] demonstrate that Congress has expressly specified the ambiguous transactions which are to be regarded as sales or exchanges
for income tax purposes". . . made much of the fact that this type of
transaction was not mentioned by section 117. The answer of the
Court was short and to the point :53

"We are not impressed by this argument. If the transaction fits
the legal requirements for a sale, we see no reason for specific
mention of it among a list classifying as a sale that which would
not ordinarily be regarded as such a transaction."
Similar results have followed in the Tax Court in a case5" involving
the release to the lessor of a restrictive convenant in a lease and in
a case 55 in which a lessee who had become a statutory tenant under
a New York emergency rent control law vacated and surrendered
the premises to his former lessor for consideration. Both of these
cases, however, have been appealed by the Commissioner.5" It is difficult to see how a right under a lease has actually been transferred
to the lessor-obligor anymore than in the debt cases. The right to possession, for example, seems to spring from the reversionary interest.
But, practically speaking, the lessor has acquired a valuable right,
and the lessee clearly has received an asset of continuing value. The
only real difficulty is in finding a transfer of the lessor's right from
the lessee.
Options are treated more consistently with the doctrine of the
debt cases; it is held that surrender of the option to the optionor for
cash merely terminates the existence of the option and does not result
in a "sale or exchange.

' 57

50 Commissioner v. Golonsky, 200 F.2d 72 (3rd Cir. 1952).

5'Supra, n. 4.
52 313 U.S. at 251.

53200
F.2d at74.
54

Louis W. Ray, 18 T.C. 438 (1952).

55 McCue Bros. & Drummond, Inc., 19 T.C. 667 (1953).
5

6McCue Bros. & Drummond, Inc. to the Second Circuit and Ray to the Fifth.
Compare on this problem, United Cigar-Whelan Stores Corp. v. District of
Columbia, 176 F.2d 952 (D.C. Cir. 1949), in which it was held that the cancellation of a lease with consideration to the lessee is not a "sale or exchange" under the District of Columbia income tax law.
5 Seth M. Milliken, 15 T.C. 243 (1950)., aff'd 196 F.2d 135 (2nd Cir. 1952).
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V
EMPLOYMENT AND

EXCLUSIVE AGENCY CONTRACTS

No doubt arises as to the taxability of compensation for services
as ordinary income, 58 and this is true even though it is conceivable
that the right not to render services is somehow a capital asset which
has been the subject of a "sale or exchange" the consideration for
which is the compensation in question. Similarly, amounts received
for promises not to compete are considered as substitutes for wages
and are also taxable as ordinary income. 59 However, question is often
made of the character of transactions in which a lump sum payment
is made which is somehow connected with the performance of services
of one sort or another. The courts have been diligent in these cases to
prevent capital treatment of income which is the equivalent of compensation, especially where the transaction is cast in its form in order
to get capital treatment. 60 In Thurlow E. McFal, 61 where the taxpayers, skilled employees, had "sold" their employment contracts to
a third person who was in no position to perform, the Board held
that the "Petitioner did not sell their contracts, for this inherently
they could not do. The contracts bound them to perform services of
skill." 62 In George K. Gann,63 the Board held that an amount received
by the taxpayer-employee from his employer in consideration of cancellation of his employment contract was ordinary income, because,
just as in McFall, the taxpayer could not "selr' his contract, and further that the amount paid was merely a translation of the taxpayer's
right to receive future compensation into a single sum payable at
once. Most interesting, however, is the fact that the Board quoted
from its decision in Walter M. Hort,64 in which it held that money
paid by a lessee to his lessor for cancellation of the lease was ordinary
income, since "the lease was extinguished, not sold or exchanged. The
lessee did not acquire any valuable asset but merely obtained a release from his liabilities under the lease." 65 This language indicates
that the rule in Hale v. Helvering66 applies also to this sort of situation. This is, however, no longer true of all employment contract
cancellations; to conform to section 329 of the Revenue Act of 1951,
section 29.117-14 was added to Regulations 111, deeming a "sale or
58

Treas. Reg. 118, §39.22(a)-1, et seq.
59 Beal's Estate v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 268 (2nd Cir. 1936).
60 Cf. supra, n. 15.
6134 B.T.A. 108 (1936).

62 Ibid., at 110, citing Arkansas Valley Smelting Co. v. Beldin Mining Co., 127
U.S. 379 (1888).
6341 B.T.A. 388 (1940).
64 39 B.T.A. 922 (1939), aff'd 313 U.S. 28 (1940): supra, n. 45.
65 39 B.T.A. at 926.
66
Supra, n. 11.
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exchange" to be present with respect to certain employment contract
67
termination payments.
A situation somewhat related to the cancellation of an employment contract arises when an exclusive agency contract is cancelled
for consideration to the agent; but in this area the decisions are somewhat confused, and a conflict of authority exists between the circuits
on the precise point of whether the transaction represents a "sale or
exchange," or the mere extinguishment of an obligation.
In 1941, the case of Elliott B. Smoak6 came before the Board; in
this case, the taxpayer for consideration had relinquished to his principal his exclusive right to develop his sales territory, the right to
royalties from future sales and from existing licensees, his records
and office files and the good will he had built up over the previous two
years. The Board held that the case was unlike McFall and Gann in
that the taxpayer transferred a going agency business with all its
assets, not merely the contractual right to receive future royalties. In
determining that there was a "sale" of the business, the Board empha' 69
sized that if the transfer of his interest by a partner is a "sale,
a fortiori the transfer of a going agency business is also a "sale." To
the extent that goodwill and tangible assets are concerned, there would
seem to be a "sale or exchange." But the question arises as to whether
in such situations the "single entity" or "fragmentization" approach
should be applied: in determining whether capital assets were involved
the Second Circuit has applied the "fragmentization" approach, declaring that on the transfer of a sole proprietorship each asset must
be considered individually. 70 The approach, however, has relevance
only in determining whether capital assets are involved; the matter of
whether a "sale or exchange" is present is another question. In Jones
v. Corbyn,'1 the Tenth Circuit decided that, where the taxpayers received a lump sum in consideration of the cancellation of a lifetime
exclusive insurance agency contract and the transfer of the records
and office files of the agency, there was a "sale" within the meaning
of section 117. A dissenting judge expressed the opinion that the case
should have been decided with the application of the rules in McFall
and Gann, since the taxpayers had apparently transferred nothing but
their right to receive compensation in the future. The dissent in Jones
v. Corbyn appears to be the more logical view, but it weakened its
67

See

INT. REv. Code §117(p) ; Treas. Reg. 118, §39.117(p). An employee who releases, for consideration, his right to a percentage of his employer's profits
after termination of employment is deemed to have "sold or exchanged"
that right if certain conditions are fulfilled.

6843 B.T.A. 907 (1941).
69

United States v. Adamson, 161 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1947).
70 Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2nd Cir. 1945).

7' 186 F2d 450 (10th Cir. 1950).

1953-54]

COMMENTS

position by attempting to distinguish Smoak which clearly must stand
or fall on the same ground.
In 1949, confronted with a case7 2 in which the taxpayer had received cash for releasing a company of its contract to pay him monthly
sums based on sales of gas to another organization, the Tax Court,
without hesitation, said,73 "The contract here was not sold, it was
extinguished. Lomita [the company] acquired no exchangeable asset.
The transaction, although in form a sale, was a release of an obligation." But in 1952, when Starr Bros., Inc.7 1 was presented to them,
involving the. same sort of situation as Jones v. Corbyn, the Court
ignored the argument of the Commissioner .. .that no "sale or exchange" could have resulted from the transaction, since there was
merely the extinguishment of an obligation ... and followed Jones v.
Corbyn. The Commissioner appealed to the Second Circuit, which reversed the Tax Court,7 5 saying that the case was analogous to cases
involving surrender of notes to their maker, clearly instances of the
extinguishment of an obligation since nothing survives the transaction
77
in the hands of the maker. 6 It was further stated that cases of
surrender of a life tenant's interest to his remainderman were not
applicable, and the fact was stressed that the transaction was not of
78
a type deemed specifically bj the Code as a "sale or exchange.1
Jones v. Corbyn was disapproved, but might possibly have been distinguished, since that case involved a transfer of goodwill.
Shortly after Commissioner v. Starr Bros., Inc., the Second Circuit again dealt with a similar problem when it decided the case of
General Artists Corp. v. Commissioner.79 In this case, the taxpayer
corporation had transferred its contracts with a singer as his exclusive booking agent to another agent by an agreement providing for
the cancellation of those contracts and the execution of new contracts between the singer and the other agent. It was again held that
no "sale or exchange" was involved in the transaction. The Court
anticipated any attempt to distinguish the Starr Bros., Inc. case stating:
"It might be suggested that the instant case differs from that
of Starr Bros. because the latter involved a release of a binding negative covenant to the obligor, whereas here there was
a transfer to a third party of the rights under the covenant.
72 Charles E. McCartuey, 12 T.C. 320 (1949).
"s Ibid., at 324.

74 18 T.C. 149 (1952). In this case, a dealer in drugs received a sum of money
in exchange for releasing a manufacturer from its contract obligation not
to sell its products to other dealers in the community.
75Commissioner
v. Starr Bros., Inc., 204 F.2d 673 (2nd Cir. 1953).
76
Bingham v. Commissioner, supra, n. 35. Cf. Hale v. Helvering, supra, n. 11.
77
E.g., McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235 (2nd Cir. 1946), cert. denied

330 U.S. 826 (1947).
sCiting Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., supra, n. 4.

79 205 F.2d 360 (2nd Cir. 1953).
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But we think that there was a release to the obligor of a negative covenant in order to allow a new covenant to be made
with the third party."80
On the very same days ' that Commsisioner v. Starr Bros., Inc. was
decided by the Second Circuit, the Tax Court handed down an opinion
which handled a similar problem and came to an opposite result. The
case was that of Henrietta B. Goff. 2 Here, the taxpayer corporation
had sold certain machinery to another corporation, but had retained
the right to have the machinery used exclusively for a specified period
for the production of at least 750 pairs of hosiery which were to be
sold to it at prices stipulated in the agreement of sale. The Tax
Court decided that the proceeds received by the taxpayer for release of this right were derived from a "sale or exchange," since from
the time of the release the other corporation possessed something
which it did not have before, namely, the right to do with the machinery as it wished. Relied on in Goff as authority were Commissioner v. Golonsky,83 McCue Bros. & Drummond, Inc., 8 4 Louis W.
Ray, 5 Jones v. Corbyn,s8 Elliott B. Smoak,7 and the Tax Court decision in Starr Bros., Inc.8s This imposing array of precedent loses
its force, however, when it is observed that Starr Bros., Inc. was reversed by the Second Circuit in a decision that expressly ignored the
majority opinion in Jones v. Corbyn and followed the dissent in that
case, while citing Commissioner v. Golonsky merely as an example of
the broad construction given to "sale or exchange" by the Third Circuit. McCue Bros. & Drummond, Inc. and Louis W. Ray have both
been appealed by the Commissioner," McCue Bros. & Drummond, Inc.
to the Second Circuit, whose attitude on the question will undoubtedly
be conditioned by its decision in Commissioner v. Starr Bros., Inc.
The Smoak case is the only decision cited in Goff that has not been
challenged, but its value as precedent in the light of the decision in
Commissioner v. Starr Bros., Inc. is questionable.
VI
CONCLUSION

In its decision affirming the Tax Court in Seth M. Mllikep, the
Second Circuit expressed doubt as to whether a mere extinguishment
so Ibid., at 361.
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of an obligor's duty can ever constitute a "sale or exchange." 90 The
decision in the Starr Bros., Inc., case91 is perfectly consistent with
this view, and the language used in General Artists Corp. v. Commissioner92 indicates that the court is still similarly minded. But it
is questionable whether the principle can be stated so broadly; the
mortgage cases, discussed in Section III of this comment apparently
have rules of their own; and it is clear that when a claim is satisfied
by the transfer of property, the property is regarded as having been
the subject of a "sale or exchange."9 " The lease cases represent another exception to the rule; but, as mentioned in the Starr Bros., Inc.
case, they involve a broad interpretation of "sale or exchange." This
broad interpretation may not continue to be followed in the atmosphere created by Starr Bros., Inc.
The Starr Bros., Inc. rule is sound law, but there nevertheless
seems to be a valid question of public policy as to whether or not
that rule frustrates the very purpose of the favorable treatment given
to capital gains, i.e., to encourage the taxable transfer of property
which would otherwise be untransferred and untaxed. This purpose is certainly just as applicable to the release of exclusive agency
contracts and leases, especially those contracts or leases of long duration, as it is to the transfer of any other capital asset. In the Werner
case, 94 the Board, on an examination of legislative history, took this
point of view and stated that "sale or exchange" were very broad
terms ... broad enough to include the retirement of bonds before maturity. Werner was soon overruled,95 however, the Board taking the
position that inspection of the legislative history of the capital gains
and losses statute was improper since the statute was sufficiently clear
on its face as far as "sale or exchange" was concerned. A return
to the broad concept of "sale or exchange" outlined in Werner might
not be unwarranted . . . not only to encourage taxable disposition of
property whose value has appreciated, but also to reduce costly tax
litigation based upon a group of filmy legal fictions, and to simplify
tax administration.
ROBERT

90

196 F.2d at 136, (n. 1); supra. n. 57.

91 Supra, n. 75.
9
2 Supra, n.
93

See n. 14.

79 and n. 80.

94 Supra, n. 5.
95 Watson, supra, n. 6.

H. GORSKE

